By Paul McNamee — Captain, Frontier Partisans New England Ranging Company
It never goes well in Nuristan.
Nuristan province in northern Afghanistan is historically some of the most difficult terrain in which to conduct warfare. It is the land of Rudyard Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King. The mountains chewed up the forces of Alexander the Great, the British Empire, and the Soviets. In the early 2000s, it was the United States turn.
Jake Tapper’s The Outpost is a thick volume, detailing specifically the life and death of Command Outpost Keating, near the villages of Kamdesh and Urmul. The history of the outpost involves the entire province. Summarizing the book isn’t easy but in the end, the book constantly highlights American valor — more often than not in the face of terror, tragedy, anger, and frustration.
Any photograph of Combat Post Keating quickly exposes the issue — the base was at the foot of mountains. Regardless of 21st century military tech, basic combat adages do not change. The failure to secure the high ground was going to be a problem from day one. Everyone knew it. The hard-headed brass pushed on anyway. The initial focus was to monitor roads and passes into Pakistan, where insurgents could come and go with impunity. Any base to monitor roads meant something would be built along the road, at the bottom of a valley somewhere.
What could go wrong?
The base was named for Ben Keating — killed when the vehicle he was driving went off the road. Vehicle wrecks, helicopter crashes and botched medivacs made it clear early on that Americans were at war with the terrain long before the insurgents started firing RGPs and AKs in their direction.
The combat was harrowing. Nearly every day men would be under harassment fire. From a headline distance, it doesn’t seem like much. But Tapper gives us a closeup view of wounds and pain and horror — RPG shrapnel, limbs obliterated. WIA doesn’t not mean KIA but neither does it mean the quality of your life will be anywhere near the same when you are mustered home with PTSD and missing limbs.
As with so many combat theaters, it came down the the boots on the ground carrying on, doing their job, and watching out for each other. They certainly weren’t about to trust their esteemed leaders in Washington, D.C.
Deadly combat under almost impossible conditions.
At the end, Obama’s desire for a wind-down did not ingratiate him to troops already undersupplied and overworked. But it’s clear no one in Afghanistan thought too highly of Bush and Cheney from the start, either. As soon as the Iraq War was underway, the Bush White House clearly favored the Iraqi theater of operations. Afghanistan received a pittance of airpower and equipment in comparison.
The military brass weren’t doing the grunts any favors. Tapper’s book left me with the feeling that for all the talk of plans and intelligence, the brass were throwing everything at the wall and seeing what stuck. Officers on the ground were making their own calls – leading to oscillation anytime some was replace or rotated. Some favored counter-insurgency only to be replaced by others who preferred a straight ahead combat stance. And Special Forces were roaming far and wide — answerable to no one.
The Afghans themselves ran the gamut from brave to cowardice, from altruistic to a weakness for graft. Many of the infrastructure projects resulted in nothing more than village elders jockeying for money, influence, and power. The Afghan National Army served up some of the best troops and some of the worst.
The American soldier in Afghanistan was most often left to their own devices.
In October 2009, everything came to the worst possible head. The insurgents launched a coordinated attack with hundreds men. They knew the base was being decommissioned. It was their best chance to take the base and kill Americans, and they took it.
The Outpost should be required reading to understand what our troops have gone through – were put through. Their valor cannot be forgotten. The lessons must be learned and applied or we are doomed to continue to waste talented military lives in the Afghan theater. The service men and women deserve more – much more – from their superiors and civilian government commanders.
Paul McNamee says
Uh-oh. Typo at the end “THE OUTPUT” should be “THE OUTPOST” 🙂
JimC says
Fixed.
Ordie_Rat says
I have read this book and it is a great read. It gives you a better understanding of what it is to be a combat grunt. I spent 20 years in the military and understand the meaning of sacrifice and watching your friends get killed. The only thing was I was on carriers in the Navy. However I also went in during Vietnam so I got to be one of those who reviled by his fellow countrymen, now the “Hippies” say they “support the troops but not the war.” War never solves anything, but lying around, smoking weed, and listening to subpar jam bands is undoubtedly making this world a better place as we speak. God, I detest hippies and lefties.
JimC says
Thanks for stopping by the campfire Ordie Rat.
Black Tyrone says
OK to forgive for piece of mind only… BUT NEVER FORGET!
Keith West says
I’m going to have to look for this one.
Matthew says
That definitely sounds like one interesting book. Though probably one I have to be in the right mood to read.
deuce says
“Many of the infrastructure projects resulted in nothing more than village elders jockeying for money, influence, and power.”
The story of foreign aid–especially foreign aid to Third World countries–in a nutshell. The exceptions prove the rule.
I’ll probably read this book at some point, like I have so many other accounts of lost causes and last stands.
Good post, Jim.
JimC says
All credit to Shieldwall mate Paul McNamee.
deuce says
Oops! Kinda scrolled past that too fast. Good post, PAUL.
Breaker Morant says
Have not read “The Outpost” yet, but I have read “Red Platoon” by Clinton Romesha (MOH recipient) which is also about the attack on Keating. I think it is the same battle.
JimC says
Listened to Red Platoon on audio. Same battle.
Paul McNamee says
Keith, Matthew, et al,
It’s a hard read sometimes when soldiers are introduced and you just know they aren’t going to come out alive or intact.
I was laid up with the flu and read through a lot of it then.
As I noted, there are a lot of details – more than I wanted to tackle in a review. But, it’s an eye-opener and worth reading, I think.
Fletcher Vredenburgh says
Sounds cool. I’ve been curious if this was worth the read and it sounds like it is.
Greg Marshall says
It’s very well written. I read it some time ago and found it very affecting. All the excellent training and gear in the world can’t compensate for brain-dead command decisions.
How can such a well-educated and trained officer corps continue to waste the lives of their soldiers?
I just finished reading Lartéguy’s “The Centurions”, which begins with the fall of Dien Bien Phu and ends with the disgrace of the Paras in Algiers. There are echos there. I truly hope that the consequences of the Forever War are not similar to those the French engagement in Indochina.
JimC says
Oh, man, I bet that’s interesting.
john roberts says
I remember seeing that picture of the base and thinking, “What military genus sited that base?” High ground in every direction including across the river. With a couple of heavy mortar companies I could reduce it to rubble in hours, and I’m not even a mortarman.
Paul McNamee says
At one point, the insurgents did acquire a mortar and started hitting the outpost. It was a step up from small arms and RPGs and it was an extra tense time, for certain.
Saddle Tramp says
Paul…
Anyone who includes Kipling already has my attention. Have not read this I cannot make any kind of accurate (and definitely not precise) conclusions as to all of the details. The highlights you mention do however give one a good sense of it. I am afraid we have seen this all too often before. Honor and bravery spent on ill conceived strategies and deployments. History is full of these examples. Desperation is one thing but calculated in advance (fluidity of combat excluded) makes this sound very frustrating at least how it appears from your post. Alexander The Great (and even much later Britain) may be excused by the limitations of technology at the time. Knocking the lights out is one thing, but rebuilding a self-sustaining country is quite another. I hate to admit it myself (in honor of those who sacrificed) but it seems to me we have it ass backwards, but I hold out to be proven otherwise. The Czech Republic pushed out Russia with a mass protest by Czecks who wanted change. Perhaps it was not as simple as that but rather was the culmination of many things. Maybe we need someone like Alexander
The Great to sever the Gordian Knot. Lord knows we have spent the time, treasure and lives in never ending pursuit of untangling this. I envy no man or woman who tries. I hope it all goes to the good eventually for those worthy of it. I could easily be pessimistic, and I do not view the world through rose colored glasses. I am rather looking through the glass darkly hoping for a glimmer of light, otherwise darkness wins. Thanks for the post Paul.
Saddle Tramp says
Addendum:
Disclaimer:
Never compare apples to oranges.
No one formula fits all.
Some fail miserably.
Afghanistan is not the Czech Republic.
What formula to apply? A combination of more than one I suspect, but don’t shoot me Inam only the truck driver…
john roberts says
I’ve long held that it should be a bedrock principle of American foreign policy that YOU CANNOT DO ANY GOOD IN THE MIDDLE EAST. This extends to Afghanistan. Nobody in all of recorded history has met with anything but disaster in that place. To think that your incursion will be different is purest hubris.
Saddle Tramp says
With all due respect. My opinion on hubris is a baseless over confidence and haughty pride in achieving something. My position is only that of dim hope and [our] involvement may be minimal to non existent. My entire position on the Middele East is that of hypocrisy, self interest and hegemony in the world. The premise was who controls the oil controls the world. That is fading more and more as the U.S. is becoming more and more independent of that (with it’s own set of issues and repercussions). Hell, even Saudi Arabia is reconsidering their future. Nothing is static however and I sure as hell don’t own a cristal ball. I do however how one could easily take that position of futility. That would be my first inclination right out of the chute…
lane batot says
Heck, I think that place could have been reduced to rubble using rubble! I think such locations should, in the future, be referred to as a “rock-chucker camps”….Yeah, and a shame(and a tragedy) in SO MANY CASES that leaders are not picked for actual intelligent leadership skills and knowledge(in whatever field they are working in). People applying for leadership positions should AT LEAST havta pass a simple, basic, test highlighting COMMON SENSE–just as many dogs used for work of various sorts havta pass certain temperment tests. And if they don’t pass, they don’t git the job, no matter who dey daddy is!
Matthew says
I honestly thought that the base could have been assaulted by rolling rocks down from the way it looked in the picture. I don’t know who would have thought that it was a good idea.
Saddle Tramp says
As usual you have the commonsensical approach that is most basic approach for sure. How something could be so blatantly obvious is mystifying to me. I have not read the book or studied the factors surrounding the whole decision making. In my decision making progress I took in all the angles from the one operating the equipment and the process as well as the grey haired engineers so to speak and then my personal experience. All opinions were welcome. This is with long range decision making as well as with on the spot decision making. All opinions welcome when practical. From the ground up to the top down. Nobody opinion is not worthwhile. After all data is in a decision is made. Desperate or time critical
decisionmaking is a different thing altogether. Where this crossed the line I cannot say without reading it in entirety as well as other sources. On it’s face it appears to be a failure from the top. When the ship goes down you don’t blame the yeoman. The problem with this terrain and is the threading of the needle. We know we could with an all out effort lay the land to waste. That is where the difficulty comes in. Could go on ad nauseam, but this has been addressed by better experts on the subject. As Craig so wisely mentioned somewhere that war and crime will always continue. This is even more clear with the types of warfare today. Let’s hope we don’t see a transition to something even worse. This appears to be a classic example of both strategic and tactical failure. Whether or not it was well intentioned it appears to have been ill conceived and poorly executed. I reserve any final conclusion since I was not there and this post is an invitation to go deeper and an good example of our frustrated efforts in formidable and hostile as hell territory. Brings to mind John Roberts strong point. Should we even be there? I wish I was qualified enough to answer that, but I am not. We just might have to let nature take it’s course (so to speak) as in a Viet Nam. There are no fairy tale endings in history.,.
Saddle Tramp says
CORRECTION:
How this stuff sneaks in unawares is beyond me.
Apologies.
From:
Whether or not it was well intentioned or not it appears to not have been ill conceived and poorly executed.
To:
Whether or not it was well intentioned or not, it appears to [have been] ill conceived and poorly executed.
JimC says
Noted and corrected.
Saddle Tramp says
Thanks Jim…
I do review, but I never seem to see it until it gets posted. It happens equally as much when I hand write something. A blind spot of some sort. Sorry for the inconvenience as I know you have enough on your plate. That is one advantage with the Book Of Face (maybe the only one) and Instagram. You can self edit and correct after posting. I rely on it. I do not like burdening you with it. Maybe I need to be on a word allowance as well. Lessen the odds of error…
JimC says
Oh hell, I find errors in my copy sometimes years later.